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THE PCS NITROGEN CASE:  
A CHILLING EFFECT ON PROSPECTIVE 
CONTAMINATED LAND PURCHASES 
KELLIE FISHER* 
Abstract: The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA) requires that all potentially responsible parties, in-
cluding current and former land owners, contribute to the costs of cleanup of 
contaminated property. CERCLA includes a provision that grants bona fide 
prospective purchaser (BFPP) status and exemption from liability to land 
owners if liability under CERCLA is based solely on owning the land. In PCS 
Nitrogen v. Ashley II of Charleston, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit refused to grant BFPP status to Ashley II and suggested that a high 
standard of due care is required to obtain such status. This Comment argues 
that the court’s decision, and its suggestion that a high standard of due care is 
necessary to avoid liability, will make it more difficult for purchasers of con-
taminated land to avoid joint and several liability under CERCLA. The court’s 
decision will deter businesses from purchasing contaminated land with the in-
tention of remediation and redevelopment. 
INTRODUCTION 
A large piece of contaminated land in Charleston, South Carolina sits on 
the bank of the Ashley River.1 The EPA had designated the land as a Super-
fund site, businesses have come and gone, and the costs associated with clean-
ing up the land after years of degradation were estimated to be enormous.2 
Finally, a development company, ready to change the landscape of Charleston, 
assumed cleanup and redevelopment responsibility over the land.3 Yet this 
company, which attempted to follow the applicable regulations, is now facing 
large costs associated with investigating the contamination and remediating 
the site.4 
Ashley II of Charleston, LLC (“Ashley”) is a business that hoped to 
utilize the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2013–2014. 
 1 Ashley II of Charleston, LLC v. PCS Nitrogen, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 2d 692, 699 (D.S.C. 
2010). 
 2 See id. at 726; Brief for Appellee at 5, 7, PCS Nitrogen v. Ashley II of Charleston, 714 F.3d 
161 (4th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-1662). 
 3 See PCS Nitrogen, 714 F.3d at 171. 
 4 See id. 
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Liability Act (CERCLA) and the Small Business Liability Relief and 
Brownfields Revitalization Act (“Brownfields Act”) to clean and redevelop 
the piece of contaminated land along the bank of the Ashley River in 
Charleston, and to recover cleanup costs from the parties responsible for the 
contamination.5 The land, subjected to a century of degradation, was con-
taminated with lead, arsenic, and other dangerous materials, all hazardous 
to human health and the surrounding environment.6 Furthermore, the land 
along the Ashley River is critical to the revitalization of the Charleston met-
ropolitan area.7 Ashley had a proven record of success in decontaminating 
land for a sustainable development, as it had already remediated twenty 
parcels of land for its Magnolia Development.8 
With the support of the City of Charleston, the EPA, and the South 
Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, Ashley began to 
remediate the site and expected to hold the previous owners of the land lia-
ble for cleanup costs under CERCLA.9 Ashley anticipated remaining ex-
empt from liability because of the bona fide prospective purchaser exemp-
tion established in the Brownfields Act, but in PCS Nitrogen, Inc. v. Ashley 
II of Charleston, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held Ash-
ley liable for costs associated with cleanup with the other previous owners 
that contributed to contamination of the site.10 Money from investors, given 
with the intention of stimulating the economy in the area and encouraging 
cooperation with the EPA, now must go to cleanup costs, and as investment 
in the land has stopped and funds are no longer available, Ashley cannot 
proceed with the Magnolia Development project at the site.11 
This Comment argues that the court’s decision to deny Ashley bona 
fide prospective purchaser status, and the simultaneous decision to allocate 
liability to Ashley, will chill Brownfields redevelopment and ultimately 
hinder cleanup efforts.12 The Fourth Circuit’s decision was contrary to the 
purpose of the Brownfields Act, and the court should have found that Ash-
ley exercised the appropriate standard of due care when remediating the 
site, and therefore should not be held liable for cost recovery.13 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See Ashley II of Charleston, 746 F. Supp. 2d. at 697, 699. 
 6 See PCS Nitrogen, 714 F.3d at 168. 
 7 Brief for Appellee, supra note 2, at 6. The City of Charleston has taken substantial steps to 
ensure that the site returns to productive use, including issuing tax increment financing bonds and 
municipal improvement bonds for the project. Ashley II of Charleston, 746 F. Supp. 2d. at 722. 
 8 Brief for Appellee, supra note 2, at 67. 
 9 See id. 
 10 See PCS Nitrogen, 714 F.3d at 171, 181. 
 11 See Brief for Appellee, supra note 2, at 6. 
 12 See id. at 67. 
 13 See Small Business Liability Protection Act: Proceedings and Debates on H.R. 2869, 107th 
Cong. 1 (2001) (statement of Rep. Frank Pallone) [hereinafter Pallone’s Statement]; President 
Signs Brownfields Bill, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 11, 2002), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.
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I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The forty-three acre parcel of contaminated land that borders the Ash-
ley River in Charleston, South Carolina, has a long history of changing 
hands and subdivision.14 From 1884 to the early 1900s, seven phosphate 
fertilizer plants operated in close proximity to the site.15 In 1906, Planters 
Fertilizer & Phosphate Company (“Planters”) purchased the site and began 
to produce sulfuric acid and manufacture fertilizer.16 Planters used pyrite 
ore as the primary fuel for sulfuric acid production, which produced a slag 
containing high levels of arsenic and lead.17 The company spread the slag 
over the property to stabilize roads on the site.18 The pollutants in this slag 
are responsible for the majority of the arsenic and lead contamination on 
site today.19 
In 1966, Planters sold the fertilizer plant to Columbia Nitrogen Corpo-
ration (“Old CNC”).20 The Old CNC continued to produce the acid and fer-
tilizer until the early 1970s and contributed to soil contamination onsite.21 
In 1985, Old CNC sold the property to James H. Holcombe and J. Henry 
Fair (collectively “Holcombe and Fair”), but did not transfer its corporate 
liabilities for past actions on the site, which effectively made Old CNC a 
potentially responsible party (“PRP”) for the site.22 Holcombe and Fair did 
not know about the contamination at the time of purchase and only discov-
ered it in 1990.23 Old CNC was acquired by the Columbia Nitrogen Corpo-
ration, which, after a series of mergers and acquisitions, was eventually ac-
quired by PCS Nitrogen.24 
Holcombe and Fair subdivided and conveyed several parcels from the 
original site to Robin Hood Container Express (“RHCE”), the City of Charles-
ton, and Allwaste Tank Cleaning, Inc.25 Although Holcombe and Fair, as well 
                                                                                                                           
gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020111-3.html, available at http://perma.cc/Q273-YK3R (remarks 
from President George W. Bush in signing the Brownfields Act). 
 14 See Brief for Appellee, supra note 2, at 5, 7. 
 15 PCS Nitrogen, 714 F.3d at 168–69. 
 16 Id. at 169. 
 17 Ashley II of Charleston, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 702. Burning the pyrite ore during production of 
sulfuric acid created contaminated slag as a byproduct. See PCS Nitrogen, 714 F.3d at 169. 
 18 PCS Nitrogen, 714 F.3d at 169. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Ashley II of Charleston, 746 F. Supp. 2d. at 704. 
 21 PCS Nitrogen, 714 F.3d at 169. Old CNC generated dust that contained elevated levels of 
arsenic and lead in its production of superphosphate fertilizer. It also conducted construction and 
demolition activities that affected almost eighty percent of the soil on the site. Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at 170. 
 24 Complaint at 24, 31, Ashley II of Charleston, 746 F. Supp. 2d 692 (05CV02782), 2005 WL 
2919589. 
 25 PCS Nitrogen, 714 F. 3d at 170, 171. 
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as the purchasers of the parcels, did not introduce arsenic or lead into the 
ground, the companies did own parcels of land when the action was com-
menced.26 
In 2003, Holcombe and Fair sold the remaining 27.62-acre parcel to 
Ashley for $2.7 million.27 Ashley knew of the contamination at the time of 
purchase, and intended to remediate the site under CERCLA as a part of its 
Magnolia Development project.28 To comply with CERCLA, Ashley hired 
an environmental engineer with more than thirty-five years of experience.29 
Working with the EPA and the engineer, the parties agreed that the remedia-
tion would include soil removal action, groundwater treatment, and sedi-
ment action.30 The total cost of the work was expected to be approximately 
$8 million, and Ashley intended to recover the response costs under the 
CERCLA and the Brownfields Act.31 As of April 2013, Ashley had incurred 
at least $194, 000 in response costs at the site.32 
To recover the response costs for the site remediation, Ashley filed an 
action against PCS Nitrogen in federal court on September 26, 2005, and 
contended that PCS Nitrogen was a successor corporation to Old CNC, and 
therefore was liable as a PRP.33 PCS denied liability and filed a contribution 
counterclaim under 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) against Ashley, as well as the other 
parties who owned parcels of the original piece of land either in the past or 
present.34 These parties filed counter- and cross-claims against one another 
under § 9613(f) and sought determination of their rights to future cost re-
covery and contribution.35 The district court bifurcated the proceedings into 
liability and allocation phases, and a decision was rendered by the district 
court in October of 2010.36 In April 2013, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the 
district court’s decision.37 The Fourth Circuit affirmed that PCS Nitrogen 
was a corporate successor to Old CNC and was therefore jointly and sever-
ally liable for response costs at the site.38 The Fourth Circuit also allocated 
                                                                                                                           
 26 See id. 
 27 Id. at 171. 
 28 See Brief for Appellee, supra note 2, at 5–6. 
 29 See id. at 73. 
 30 See id. at 19. 
 31 Ashley II of Charleston, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 697, 726. 
 32 PCS Nitrogen, 714 F.3d at 171. 
 33 Complaint, supra note 24, at 31. 
 34 PCS Nitrogen, 714 F.3d at 171. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Ashley II of Charleston, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 698. 
 37 PCS Nitrogen, 714 F.3d at 167. 
 38 Id. at 176. 
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liability to other PRPs named in the suit, including Holcombe and Fair, 
RHCE, and Ashley.39 
Ashley bought the property with the intention of obtaining bona fide 
prospective purchaser (“BFPP”) status.40 The district court held that Ashley 
failed to establish a number of the eight criteria needed for BFPP status.41 
This included a failure to exercise appropriate care with respect to hazard-
ous substances found at the facility by taking reasonable steps “to (i) stop 
any continuing release; (ii) prevent any threatened future release; and (iii) 
prevent or limit human, environmental, or natural resource exposure to any 
previously released hazardous substance.”42 
The district court gave several examples of situations in which Ashley 
did not use appropriate care, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 43  Ashley 
failed to remove a debris pile from the site, but the pile was tested and there 
was no contamination above EPA levels of established concern.44 Further-
more, the appropriate care standard applies only to hazardous substances, 
but the pile in question only contained trash and debris.45 The EPA and the 
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control were 
aware of the pile and did not ask Ashley to take action.46 
The district court also held that Ashley failed to maintain a limestone 
run of crusher (ROC) cover on the site.47 The site had never been fully cov-
ered with a ROC cover, and when one part of the site was found to contain 
contaminated soil, the area was quickly covered with ROC.48 Finally, the 
district court found that Ashley failed to clean out concrete sumps.49 All-
waste testified that it cleaned the sumps, and the environmental engineer 
asserted that he did not see liquid in them.50 This testimony led the envi-
ronmental engineer and Ashley to reasonably believe that the sumps did not 
pose an environmental hazard.51 
                                                                                                                           
 39 See id. at 178, 179, 181. The court also held that the harm should not be apportioned, and it 
affirmed the allocation of liability. See id. at 183, 185. 
 40 See Brief for Appellee, supra note 2, at 73. 
 41 Ashley II of Charleston, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 752, 753. Ashley did not meet three of the re-
quired criteria: Ashley was found to have an improper affiliation with a PRP, did not exercise 
appropriate care at the site, and did not prove that disposal of hazardous substances did not occur 
during Ashley’s ownership. See id. at 750, 752, 753. 
 42 PCS Nitrogen, 714 F.3d at 180. 
 43 See id. at 181; Ashley II of Charleston, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 752. 
 44 Brief for Appellee, supra note 2, at 74–75. 
 45 Id. at 75. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Ashley II of Charleston, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 752. A limestone ROC layer is used to allow 
better drainage on a site. Id. at 699. 
 48 See Brief for Appellee, supra note 2, at 76. 
 49 PCS Nitrogen, 714 F.3d at 180. 
 50 Brief for Appellee, supra note 2, at 78. 
 51 See id. 
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The Fourth Circuit suggested that because the BFPP knew of the pres-
ence of hazardous waste at the facility, there should be a higher standard of 
due care required than that of an innocent landowner.52 While the Fourth 
Circuit did not decide if the BFPP standard of appropriate care at the facility 
was higher than the standard of due care mandated elsewhere in CERCLA, 
it did decide that Ashley, which knew about the presence of hazardous sub-
stances at the site, failed to take the steps required by a BFPP to establish 
appropriate care.53 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) in response to the se-
rious environmental and health risks posed by industrial pollution.54 To es-
tablish liability for cost recovery of hazardous waste cleanup under CER-
CLA, a private party plaintiff must establish the following criteria: (1) the 
defendant is a potentially responsible party (“PRP”); (2) the site constitutes 
a “facility”; (3) a “release” or a threatened release of hazardous substances 
exists at the facility; (4) the plaintiff has incurred costs responding to the 
release or threatened release of hazardous substances (“response costs”); 
and (5) the response costs conform to the National Contingency Plan.55 Lia-
bility in CERCLA cases is joint and several if the harm is indivisible.56 
There are four, non-mutually exclusive classes of PRPs liable for costs 
incurred in responding to a release of hazardous substances at a facility, as 
defined by CERCLA.57 Two examples of PRPs include the current owner or 
operator of a facility and any person who owned or operated the facility at 
the time of disposal of a hazardous substance.58 
By 2002, CERCLA’s liability scheme began to have a chilling effect 
on redevelopment projects.59 Developers were concerned about bearing the 
response costs for cleanup under CERCLA and feared prolonged entangle-
ments in litigation.60 To encourage remediation and redevelopment of sites 
                                                                                                                           
 52 PCS Nitrogen, 714 F.3d at 180. 
 53 See id. at 180, 181. 
 54 See Burlington No. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 602 (2009). 
 55 ABB Indus. Sys. v. Prime Tech., 120 F.3d 351, 356 (2nd Cir. 1997) (citing 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9706(a) (2006)). 
 56 See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 57 See Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 841 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 
42 U.S.C. § 9706(a) (2006)). 
 58 See id. The two remaining classes of PRPs include any person who arranged for disposal or 
treatment of hazardous substances at the facility and any person who accepts hazardous substances 
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels, or sites. See id. 
 59 See Brief for Appellee, supra note 2, at 65. 
 60 Id.; see S. REP. NO. 107-2, at 2–3 (2001). 
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affected by hazardous waste, Congress passed the Small Business Liability 
Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act (“Brownfields Act”) in 2002.61 
The purpose of the Brownfields Act was to relax the strict standards of 
CERCLA for developers to encourage the cleanup, remediation, and rede-
velopment of contaminated sites around the country.62 Lawmakers hoped 
that the Brownfields Act would alleviate the fears of developers and real 
estate interests and would lead to more cleanups.63 An important tool for 
encouraging redevelopment was 42 U.S.C. § 9607(r)(1); this section pro-
vided for a bona fide prospective purchaser (BFPP) exemption from liabil-
ity if liability is based solely on being an owner of a facility.64 The BFPP 
will be exempt from liability if it does not impede the performance of the 
response action.65 
To qualify for BFPP exemption when the court is allocating liability, 
the current owner or operator of a facility must have acquired the facility 
after January 11, 2002, must not impede the performance of a response ac-
tion or natural resource restoration at the facility, and must establish eight 
criteria by a preponderance of the evidence.66 One of the eight requirements 
necessary to prove BFPP exemption is that the owner must exercise appro-
priate care with respect to hazardous substances found at the facility by tak-
ing reasonable steps to (i) stop any continuing release; (ii) prevent any 
threatened future release; and (iii) prevent or limit human, environmental, 
or natural resource exposure to any previously released hazardous sub-
stance.67 The reasonable steps required under the appropriate care standard 
establish an approach that is consistent with traditional common law princi-
ples and the existing CERCLA due care requirement.68 
The court has given little guidance on how to apply the appropriate 
care standard for BFPPs.69 In the 2010 case 3000 E. Imperial, LLC v. Rob-
ertshaw Controls, Co., the U.S. District Court for the Central District of 
California dismissed a counterclaim against the plaintiff because the plain-
                                                                                                                           
 61 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, 9607. 
 62 See S. REP. NO. 107-2, at 2. 
 63 See id. at 3–4. 
 64 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(r) (2006). 
 65 Id. 
 66 PCS Nitrogen v. Ashley II of Charleston, 714 F.3d 161, 179–80 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 67 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B)(i)(II)(aa)–(cc). 
 68 Memorandum from Susan E. Bromm, EPA Office of Site Remediation Enforcement, to [vari-
ous unnamed EPA directors and administrators] 11 (Mar. 6, 2003) [hereinafter EPA Interim Guid-
ance], available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/common-elem-guide.pdf 
and http://perma.cc/95VE-BM24. 
 69 Charles S. Warren & Toni L. Finger, Courts Shed Light on the Application of CERCLA’s 
Bona Fide Prospective Purchaser Defense, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. 10790, 10790 (2011). 
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tiff established a BFPP defense.70 The plaintiff cooperated with the Califor-
nia Department of Toxic Substances to coordinate a voluntary cleanup.71 
After toxins were found in underground storage tanks, the plaintiff had liq-
uid withdrawn from the tanks and stored in drums, but several months later 
an oily substance was found floating on top of that liquid.72 The tanks were 
excavated two years after finding the oily material, but the defendant al-
leged that the plaintiff should have excavated the underground storage tank 
soon after finding to prevent further release of toxic substances into the 
groundwater.73 The court held that the plaintiff took reasonable steps to stop 
any continuing leak or prevent future leaks by draining the tanks, and the 
defendant did not provide any evidence suggesting why the plaintiff would 
have had reason to believe that the underground storage tanks were not 
empty of hazardous material or should have excavated them sooner.74 
In the 1996 case State of New York v. Lashins Arcade Co., the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the defendant demonstrat-
ed that he took all precautions regarding waste that a similarly situated rea-
sonable and prudent person would have taken considering the relevant facts 
and circumstances.75 The defendant purchased a contaminated property in 
New York.76 The seller told him that there were chemicals in the ground 
that were being treated, and in response, the defendant contacted the water 
service contractor and the town to ensure that there were no problems.77 At 
the time of closing, the defendant was unaware of the extent of the contam-
ination and of the administrative proceedings against the site.78 The court 
held that the defendant was exempt from liability because he did not play a 
role in creating the hazardous waste problem, investigated the site, and ex-
ercised due care considering all the relevant facts and circumstances.79 
In the 1992 case Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins, decided by the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, the owner of a 
shopping center sued for contribution under CERCLA after chemicals were 
found to have leaked into a well and groundwater.80 Lincoln filed a suit 
against the County for contribution and alleged that the County owned part 
                                                                                                                           
 70 3000 E. Imperial, LLC v. Robertshaw Controls Co., No. CV 08-3985 PA (Ex), 2010 WL 
5464296, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2010). 
 71 Id. at 11. 
 72 Id. at 12. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 State of N.Y. v. Lashins Arcade Co., 91 F.3d 353, 361, 362 (2nd Cir. 1996). 
 76 See id. at 357. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 360–61, 362. 
 80 Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins, 823 F. Supp. 1528, 1532 (E.D. Cal. 1992). 
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of the sewer system and wells.81 The court granted summary judgment for 
the County and held that the County established a third party affirmative 
defense by demonstrating that it exercised enough due care.82 The County 
exercised due care regarding its wells and sewer systems by testing the 
wells for hazardous material, and when the County found problems, it car-
ried out inspections and took the contaminated wells out of service.83 
In the 1994 case Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. v. Lefton Iron & Metal 
Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that the de-
fendants did not use due care when they owned the site and were therefore 
liable.84 The defendants purchased the contaminated site from the plaintiff 
in 1972, and the plaintiff hoped to recover some expenses associated with 
cleanup.85 The defendants were liable as current owners because they did 
not use due care when they owned the site, and they did not take any action 
to remove or clean up the hazardous waste and did not take the necessary 
steps to prevent foreseeable, adverse consequences.86 
III. ANALYSIS 
In PCS Nitrogen, Inc. v. Ashley II of Charleston, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to allocate 
liability to PCS Nitrogen because it was a successor corporation to Colum-
bia Nitrogen Corporation, which was a successor corporation to Columbia 
Nitrogen Corporation (“Old CNC”).87 PCS Nitrogen assumed liability for 
the contamination caused by Old CNC, and PCS Nitrogen was found liable 
for remediation costs.88 
The Fourth Circuit held that Holcombe and Fair combined were a po-
tentially responsible party (“PRP”).89 Secondary disposals, or movement or 
disposal of already-once-disposed hazardous substances through earth mov-
ing or construction activities that occur during ownership of the site, oc-
curred when Holcombe and Fair owned the property.90 Although there was 
no direct evidence to demonstrate this, the court did not require a “smoking 
                                                                                                                           
 81 See id. 
 82 See id. at 1544. 
 83 Id. at 1543–44. 
 84 Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. Lefton Iron & Metal Co., 14 F.3d 321, 325 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 85 Id. at 324. 
 86 See id. at 325. 
 87 See PCS Nitrogen v. Ashley II of Charleston, 714 F.3d 161, 176 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 88 Id at 185. 
 89 See id. at 178. 
 90 Id. at 177 (quoting Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 
1573 (5th Cir. 1988)) (“[CERCLA’s] definition of disposal does not limit disposal to a one-time 
occurrence—there may be other disposals when hazardous materials are moved, dispersed, or 
released during landfill excavations and fillings.”). 
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gun” and held that liability may be inferred from the totality of circum-
stances.91 The Fourth Circuit also held that Robin Hood Container Express 
(“RHCE”) was a PRP because it was a current operator under the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA).92 The court also decided that the PRPs are subject to joint and sever-
al liability, rather than individual share apportionment.93 
The Fourth Circuit decided that Ashley II of Charleston, LLC (“Ash-
ley”) was a PRP because Ashley was a current owner or operator of the site, 
and therefore, subject to joint and several liability.94 The court claimed not 
to determine whether the appropriate care standard for a bona fide prospec-
tive purchaser (“BFPP”) defense should be higher than the due care stand-
ard used elsewhere in CERCLA, but used the due care standard to deter-
mine whether Ashley exercised a level of appropriate care necessary to en-
act a BFPP defense.95 The court held that Ashley failed to fill in the waste 
sumps on the site, and therefore did not take all precautions regarding the 
particular waste that a similarly situated reasonable and prudent person 
would have taken considering all the relevant facts and circumstances.96 
The decision to deny Ashley BFPP status will chill cleanup and rede-
velopment efforts around the country.97 The Fourth Circuit should have giv-
en more weight to the legislative history of the Small Business Liability 
Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act (“Brownfields Act”) and held 
that Ashley exercised the appropriate level of due care when cleaning the 
Charleston site.98 As the standard of care for a BFPP is a relatively novel 
issue, there is no case law that supports the proposition that Ashley should 
be held to a higher standard than the normal due care.99 In its decision in 
PCS Nitrogen, the Fourth Circuit said logic seems to suggest that the stand-
ard of “appropriate care” required of a BFPP, who by definition knew of the 
presence of hazardous substances at a facility, should be higher than the 
standard of “due care” required of an innocent landowner, who by definition 
“did not know and had no reason to know” of the presence of hazardous 
substances when it acquired a facility.100 Although the Fourth Circuit did 
not decide whether a BFPP is held to a higher standard of care than an inno-
                                                                                                                           
 91 See PCS Nitrogen, 714 F.3d at 177 (citing Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 136 (2d Cir. 2010)). 
 92 See id. at 179. 
 93 See id. at 185. 
 94 See id. at 181. 
 95 Id. at 180–81. 
 96 See PCS Nitrogen, 714 F.3d at 180. 
 97 See Brief for Appellee, supra note 2, at 65; Warren & Finger, supra note 69, at 10792. 
 98 See Pallone’s Statement, supra note 13; President Signs Brownfields Bill, supra note 13. 
 99 See PCS Nitrogen, 714 F.3d at 180; Warren & Finger, supra note 69, at 10790. 
 100 PCS Nitrogen, 714 F.3d at 180. 
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cent purchaser, the suggestion that a higher level of due care is required is 
incorrect and inconsistent with previous cases.101 A better approach is to 
hold BFPPs to the same standard of due care as held in prior CERCLA cas-
es, because the EPA has stated that reasonable steps required under the ap-
propriate care standard establish an approach that is consistent with tradi-
tional common law principles and the existing CERCLA due care require-
ment.102 
The court in 3000 E. Imperial, LLC v. Robertshaw Controls Co. did 
not discuss a higher standard of due care to establish a BFPP defense and 
merely held that the plaintiff needed to take reasonable steps to prevent fur-
ther release of hazardous substances.103 The suggestion that BFPPs should 
be subjected to a higher standard of due care than an innocent purchaser is 
contrary to this decision.104 Although a hazardous substance was found in 
the material extracted from the tanks in 3000 E. Imperial, the tanks were 
not excavated for two years, and the court held that the plaintiff had no rea-
son to suspect that hazardous material at the site was still a threat.105 This is 
similar to the fact pattern in PCS Nitrogen, in which Ashley reasonably be-
lieved that the concrete sumps on the property were empty, and there was 
no indication that they contained hazardous material.106 
In a similar decision, the court in State of New York v. Lashins Arcade 
Co. considered the standard of due care.107 The defendant took all precau-
tions regarding the particular waste that a similarly situated reasonable and 
prudent person would have taken considering all the relevant facts and cir-
cumstances, and took the necessary steps to protect the public from a health 
or environmental threat.108 Ashley also took all precautions considering the 
relevant circumstances and met the standard of due care established in Lash-
ins. 109 Ashley hired an environmental engineer with Superfund and BFPP 
experience to guide the cleanup process to ensure that Ashley would meet 
all environmental standards, and the EPA was onsite several times.110 All-
waste, a previous owner, testified that it cleaned out the sumps and disposed 
of the waste, and the environmental engineer did not see any liquid in the 
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sumps, which led Ashley to reasonably believe that there was no present 
danger associated with the sumps onsite.111 Considering all relevant facts 
and circumstances, it is unlikely that a reasonable and prudent person would 
have discovered the contamination before Ashley cleaned the sumps.112 No 
heightened standard of care was necessary, as the EPA has stated that ap-
propriate care should be approached in a manner consonant with the due 
care requirement and should be reasonable.113 
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California found that 
the County in Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins exercised due care and 
could be exempt from liability.114 The proactive steps taken by the County, 
including testing wells and taking a well out of service when it was found to 
be contaminated, constituted an appropriate level of due care. 115 Ashley 
took similar proactive steps in its cleanup of the site, and therefore should 
have been found to have exercised an appropriate standard of due care.116 
Ashley contacted the EPA at the beginning of the remediation process and 
asked whether and when the agency thought that any actions were needed to 
comply with CERCLA.117 The PCS Nitrogen decision ignored the due care 
exercised by Ashley and imposed a heightened standard of review by sug-
gesting that BFPPs, because they know about the contamination, should be 
more careful.118 Ashley took proactive steps to remediate the contaminated 
land from the beginning of the cleanup process, and involved several agen-
cies in remediation.119 These positive steps should constitute due care under 
CERCLA and the Brownfields Act, as these statutes were intended to pro-
mote voluntary cleanup and redevelopment.120 
The court’s decision to allocate liability in Kerr-McGee Chemical 
Corp. v. Lefton Iron & Metal Co. relied on the fact that the company knew 
about the contamination and took no affirmative action to rectify the prob-
lem.121 Because the court’s decision in Kerr-McGee relies on a complete 
lack of action to remediate the site, Ashley’s affirmative steps to purchase 
and clean the Charleston site with the intent to redevelop should demon-
strate due care.122 Ashley purchased the site with the intention of remediat-
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ing and redeveloping the site for a sustainable, mixed-use project, and the 
company took active steps to ensure that the site was remediated.123 Ashley 
inspected all sumps and found that none of them leaked, yet still took af-
firmative actions to fill the sumps with concrete.124 Ashley’s contact with 
the EPA also demonstrated a willingness to cooperate and an intent to com-
ply with the BFPP standard by taking reasonable steps to prevent further 
release of hazardous substances.125 
Although the court did not rule on whether a BFPP needs to demonstrate 
a higher standard of due care than an innocent landowner, it effectively made 
such a ruling in its determination that Ashley was a PRP.126 This understand-
ing of appropriate care in CERCLA is contrary to the statute and to the legis-
lative history.127 The Brownfields Act and BFPP exemption are intended to 
lower the risk for purchasers and alleviate fears for developers, which will 
result in more cleanups around the country.128 The decision to impose a high-
er standard of care than normally used in CERCLA innocent landowner deci-
sions will make it more difficult for prospective purchasers to use the BFPP 
defense and will chill cleanup and redevelopment.129 Businesses that might 
purchase land and buildings, understanding that the site needed to be remedi-
ated and with the intention of cleaning up the site and redeveloping the land, 
will now be much more risk averse, because there is a higher possibility that 
the party cleaning the site will be subject to joint and several liability.130 
CONCLUSION 
In affirming Ashley II of Charleston, LLC’s status as a potentially re-
sponsible party in PCS Nitrogen, Inc. v. Ashley II of Charleston, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit created a heavy burden for purchas-
ers of contaminated land. Businesses that hope to purchase contaminated 
sites and redevelop the land will now be held to a strict standard of care, 
with limited room for minor mistakes. PCS Nitrogen will result in a chill in 
redevelopment projects and the remediation of far fewer contaminated sites. 
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